The Institute of Virology and Immunoprophylaxis (IVI) 
Introduction
The Institute of Virology and Immunoprophylaxis (IVI) in Switzerland is a government-operated institution and one of the few high-containment animal facilities within Europe and worldwide able to handle large animals (Summermatter, 2007) . The facility is a BSL-3Ag (mainly protection for the environment) and was inaugurated in 1992. It was built using the architectural layout of the Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL) of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) in Geelong and has served as a conceptual model for several newly built facilities in Canada, India, and Europe (e.g., the Friedrich Loeffler Institute in Riems, Germany).
Although the IVI is a BSL-3Ag facility with respect to the environment, inside the IVI most work is done at BSL-1 and -2, as those pathogens handled do not pose a hazard to humans. All the technical floors (e.g., ventilation and filtration units, liquid effluent treatment plant) are inside the high-containment area. With the emergence of avian influenza type A (H5N1) in Switzerland in 2006 (Baumer et al., 2010) , the need for a diagnostic and research facility also able to perform animal studies became evident. The Swiss veterinary office assigned the IVI as the national reference laboratory for diagnosis and research even though some strains of highly pathogenic H5N1 is risk group 3 with regard to human health. Because the IVI didn't have a BSL-3 laboratory, it was decided to retrofit two small animal stables as a BSL-3 laboratory area and have the four livestock units serve either for infection studies with non-zoonotic agricultural pathogens (exotic) or zoonotic pathogens up to risk group 3 (ABSL-3).
These plans had implications in the following areas: a) technical retrofitting of the animal units for BSL-3 use (laboratory and stables); b) integrating an additional chemical effluent treatment system into the existing structure; and c) organizational changes in procedures and operation as well as in animal experimentation. This article describes the planning, construction, problems, time, and costs as well as the procedural changes that had to be addressed.
Planning the BSL-3 and ABSL-3 Retrofitting
Much of the work in a BSL-3Ag facility is done at BSL-1 and -2 since many of the highly contagious animal diseases are not pathogenic for humans and emphasis is put on environmental protection. However, with the appearance of animal diseases like H5N1, which have the potential for a fatal outcome for humans, the situation changed. To safely work with zoonotic agents such as some strains of H5N1, work must be done in BSL-3 and ABSL-3.
Although the IVI fully met the safety criteria for a BSL-3Ag, some physical installations and procedural controls and practices specific for handling BSL-3 agents were missing (Table 1) . To maintain the most flexibility, the stables normally used for non-zoonotic animal experiments were retrofitted to be used additionally for BSL-3 animal experimentation. However, for this dual use of the stables, new standard operating procedures (SOPs) had to be developed and validated to assure personnel and environmental safety. Very early in the process it was determined that many of the tasks in the retrofitting process had to be performed by IVI personnel. The advantage of this approach was that these experienced people knew the facility much better than outsiders and thus were able to optimally plan the work and anticipate difficulties that might arise during retrofitting. In addition, this was prudent because due to biosecurity requirements for BSL3Ag facilities, internal facility personnel would have to accompany all visitors anyway. However, the disadvantage to using IVI personnel was that the internal engineering personnel could not work on the project continuously due to daily maintenance and service work.
The location of the rooms and stables to be retrofitted and the design are shown in Figure 1 . One major issue in BSL-3 work is the safe disposal of waste. Solid waste from the BSL-3 laboratory is packaged directly into 60 L United Nations'-approved plastic containers which are leak-proof and autoclavable. After surface decontamination these containers are put in the waste corridor and are immediately autoclaved. Virus cultures and other waste containing high titers of virus are autoclaved in a table-top autoclave in the BSL-3 laboratory prior to removal. However, solid waste from the stables, such as dead infected animals or liquids, has to be considered as an open source with high titers of virus, and thus a safe system for disposal had to be installed.
The newly installed service lines in the small animal rooms required some adjustments to the safety surveillance system that protects both people and instruments (e.g., new visual alarming signals in case of a gas leakage in the BSL-3 laboratory area or a fire outside the BSL-3 laboratory had to be installed). In addition to these technical changes, new SOPs also had to be developed.
Retrofitting Process
A. Rapid Transfer Port System for Livestock Units First, rapid transfer ports (RTP) (SKAN, Allschwil, Switzerland) were installed in the existing doors of the cattle stables to allow safe removal of (infected) carcasses and solid waste into rapid transfer boxes. Due to the 30-cm thick reinforced concrete walls, the installation of a pass-through box was not possible, so holes had to be cut into the stainless steel doors for the installation of the RTP (Figure 2 ). To prevent unnecessary shut down of the animal units, careful planning and coordination among external companies and internal personnel were needed.
Proper functioning of the rapid transfer boxes was validated as follows: 1) Temperatures were recorded inside the transfer box and inside biohazard bags using temperature data loggers; and 2) the outlet filters on the bottom of the rapid transfer boxes were validated by testing the filters for their retention of 0.3 µm and 0.5 µm particles under different conditions.
The setup for the temperature recording in the rapid transfer boxes is shown in Figure 3 . Two temperature data loggers were fixed on a string and placed inside a biohazard bag filled with consumables, and five data loggers were placed on the wall of the transfer box outside of the biohazard bag ( Figure 3A ). The data loggers were programmed to record the temperature every 10 seconds. An Emflon filter (KA1PFRP1, Pall Corporation, England) was attached at the transfer box ( Figure 3B ) and the box was closed. When the transfer boxes are attached to the RTP on the door, the Emflon filter is closed by a metal end piece to prevent pressure drops through the RTP when the door is opened inside the stable. The filter prevents leakage of contaminated air from the box and still allows proper functioning of the autoclaving cycle with two pre-vacuum cycles. After the process, the data from the loggers were read and analyzed. Every box was tested three or four times. In all boxes the temperature was above 121ºC for at least 20 minutes (Table 2) . To check the conditions inside a closed transfer box, one test run was performed while the filter was closed by the metal end piece (Table 3) . None of the data loggers reached the temperature of 121ºC during 20 minutes, and thus this was not acceptable as a successful inactivation cycle. In these cases the inactivation would have to be repeated with the proper configuration.
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Figure 2 A B Table 2 Validation of sterilization process of rapid transfer boxes. The filters on the transfer boxes were tested for their integrity for 0.3 µm and 0.5 µm particles using an inhouse built device. Particles were generated with DEHS (di-ethyl-hexyl-sebacat), adjusted to approximately 10 6 / min, and blown through the filter. Particle penetration was measured at the filter exhaust side with a laser particle counter (Innovation Ci-500, Climet, Redlands, CA, USA). Prior to the test the filter was treated in the following ways: a) no treatment (3 measurements); b) treatment with H2O (3 measurements); c) treatment with 70% ethanol (3 measurements); d) treatment with 100% isopropanol (3 measurements); e) treatment with disinfectant (Virocid, CID Lines, Belgium) at 0.5% (3 measurements) and 25% (1 measurement); and, finally, f) after all treatment conditions with reverse flow of the air (1 measurement). The filter was submerged in the indicated liquids and kept inside for 2 minutes. Integrity testing of the filter was performed after a 10-minute drying period. For 0.3 µm particles the efficiency was not less than 99.98%, whereas for the 0.5 µm particles the efficiency was at least 99.99% (data not shown). These values are comparable with those for a HEPA filter H13.
Transfer Box No. of Experiments Data Logger Readings
B. Chemical Effluent Treatment System
Although fully located inside the BSL-3Ag unit, the IVI's liquid effluent treatment system is not a closed system during maintenance and thus not suitable for work with zoonotic agents. Therefore, an additional chemical effluent treatment system (kill tank) had to be installed.
This kill tank for the inactivation of the liquid effluents from the ABL-3 stables had to be positioned in a central area, ideally close to the already existing system, to keep maintenance as easy and accessible as possible. In high-containment facilities redundancy of important technical installations is a requirement. To guarantee this redundancy and continuous operation of the ABSL-3 stables, two kill tanks had to be installed. One major challenge was to define the right size and location for the two kill tanks considering worst-case scenarios as well as the available space next to the existing staple tanks (Figure 1) .
The details of the new plumbing setup of the kill tanks are shown in Figure 4 . As shown in Figure 1 , the plumbing system extends over three floors: a) drains in the stables for animal experimentation; b) drain pipes in the mezzanine floor; and c) the actual location of the kill tanks in the sewage treatment plant in the basement of the facility. Every livestock unit was equipped with two drains for the waste water leading into the staple tanks. These settings allowed use of one drain from each stable for the new kill tank system. However, a full new piping system had to be built leading the waste water to the kill tanks. For non-zoonotic work the (white) valve at the mezzanine level is opened and the diverted, black valve
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Figure 4
Details of plumbing system in the mezzanine floor. Ball valve and plumbing below the stable (A), long plumbing line with (sliding) fixation of the pipe (B) and maintenance access points to plumbing system (C). for the kill tank system is closed; for zoonotic work it is inversed. It is important to ensure access to the inside of the pipes for cleaning purposes and in case of clogging. Access points to the pipes were installed at each ball valve (below each stable) and at each change of direction of the pipes ( Figures 4A, 4C ). Another important point was the inclination of the pipes which should be at least 2%, ideally 5%, for liquids coming from animal stables. Furthermore, the fixation of the pipes is crucial because temperature differences of the waste water can lead to expansion and contraction of the pipes. If the clamps of the pipes are fully fixed, expansion or contraction of these pipes may lead to a rupture. For this reason a sliding fixation of the pipes was constructed (Figures 4B, 4C ). For work with zoonotic agents, liquid effluent from all four livestock units can be collected in two kill tanks and treated with disinfectant, in this case Virocid (CID Lines, Belgium). After the decontamination cycle the treated effluent is released into a chamber below the tanks and from there pumped into the staple tanks before final thermal treatment (20 minutes, 121ºC).
Several core holes needed to be drilled from the mezzanine floor to the sewage treatment plant in the basement for the new pipes of the kill tank system. The construction of the kill tanks was planned in parallel to the core hole drilling (Figure 5 ). Due to space restrictions beside the staple tanks and based on experience in water consumption during animal experiments, two 300 L tanks were installed.
The decontamination process in the kill tanks was designed to be fully automated. When waste water reached a defined level (usable volume of <300 L), the waste water valve on top of the kill tank is closed by radar. The same radar controls the inlet of concentrated disinfectant until the final concentration of 1% is reached. The spaces at the top of the kill tank are sprayed with disinfectant with the help of a spray head that is connected to the in-house disinfection system. Continuous stirring with a magnetic stirrer guarantees a homogenous distribution of the disinfectant in the tank. Samples for checking the efficiency of the inactivation can be taken at different times through a sampling outlet.
A procedure was developed to test the efficacy of the decontamination cycle using biological indicators that are normally used for autoclaves (data not shown, Pauli & Summermatter, 2010) .
To validate the tightness of the piping system and the kill tanks, a few tests had to be performed before the entire system could be declared functional. The following worst-case scenarios were considered:
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Figure 5
Kill tank design. A A. Schematic design of one kill tank. B B. Actual picture of built in kill tanks in the sewage treatment area.
A
Filter for aeration of kill tank Top valves of kill tanks B a a) Leak test for pipes and valves. The valves on the kill tanks were closed and the pipes were filled with water up to the level of the stables. After 48 hours a visual inspection of all pipes and valves for leaks was performed. At the end of the test, additional features of the tanks were observed (e.g., time needed to empty the pipes or development of vibrations). b) Overfilling both kill tanks. The top valves of both kill tanks were opened and the pipes were filled up to the mezzanine floor level. All metal connections and the filters of the tanks were manually checked for leakage. After a short time interval (1 hour), no water was penetrating through the filters on top of the kill tanks (Emflon, Pall Corporation, England) and all metal connections were tight. After 24 hours water started to penetrate through the filters and continued to penetrate during the entire 18-day test period, whereas all metal connections remained absolutely tight. However, the water in the filters never reached a level where it was released into the sewage area outside the tanks. When releasing the water from the kill tanks at the end of the test, one kill tank slightly vibrated due to the wet filter which was blocking the air inflow. The second filter did not have any problems and was perfectly airing the other tank. Both filters were also tested for their integrity for 0.3 µm and 0.5 µm particles using the same device as described above. The efficacy for both filters was between 99.97% and 99.99%. c) Determination of time needed to reach homogeneous distribution of disinfectant in the kill tanks. During a test decontamination cycle (mixing time after addition of concentrated disinfectant was set arbitrarily at 15 minutes), subsequent samples were taken at the sampling port and tested for the concentration of disinfectant. This procedure empirically defined the proper mixing time.
New SOPs
Due to the transformation of the livestock units, new operational measures for animal experimentation had to be put in place including the handling of the kill tank. It was decided to shut off the kill tank system between experiments, thus minimizing any risks due to human error or technical failure. Additional documentation covering the following topics was developed: a) SOP for activities before and after an animal experiment (e.g., checks of opening and closing valves, information flow between scientists, biosafety, technical personnel, and animal care takers). b) SOP for the preparation of the stables before the experiment. c) SOP for the animal experimentation, sample handling inside and transport out of the stable. d) SOP for waste disposal during and after the experiment. e) SOP for room decontamination (including fumigation of stables) and efficacy control. f) SOP for donning, doffing, maintenance, and disposal of the new personal protective equipment. g) SOPs for emergency situations including practical exercises. h) SOPs for personnel training.
Time Requirements, Costs
The project's time requirements and the resulting costs are summarized in Table 4 . The indicated time was spent over a period of 3 years. The planning, design, and construction (except the two tanks) were entirely done by IVI personnel, even though all the work could have been outsourced to a contractor. Although the work was time-consuming, there were some obvious advantages: a) Since all the work had to be done while the facility was fully operational, the internal personnel already knew the safety and security rules. External contractors would have had to be accompanied and supervised by IVI personnel due to security reasons. b) The internal personnel knew best the advantages and the drawbacks of the facility on the technical side and thus had to do most of the planning anyway. Construction of the new system could be optimally implemented in the existing infrastructure. c) Internal personnel already worked in the highcontainment unit; therefore, small tasks could be finished in an efficient way and in addition to the normal work load. d) Since internal personnel operate and maintain the system, periodic maintenance costs could be minimized.
Conclusions
Although the entire process of retrofitting and upgrading was complex and needed much coordination, no major problems were encountered during planning, installation, validation, and implementation. The whole process took 3 years and cost more than $700,000 including most costs for the internal manpower. Outsourcing of all the work would have increased these costs. In addition, from the beginning internal personnel were involved in the development and construction process, thus knowing the system for future repair and maintenance work perfectly. There is one drawback: since internal personnel also had to do their daily work in addition to the construction, the project took more time than initially planned. However, the conclusion is that the advantages outweighed the disadvantages.
Retrofitting and integrating such a chemical effluent treatment system in an already existing facility is very time-consuming and complex and needs careful planning. Fortunately, there was enough space in the facility to house an additional inactivation system. However, this situation might not apply to all other facilities.
The flexible use of the livestock stables for ABSL-3 activities is a challenge for the procedures during and between animal experiments, but gives the IVI a greater flexibility with regard to the research areas. Mandatory involvement of biosafety, maintenance, and scientific personnel before, during, and after animal experimentation offers the unique possibility to better comprehend and value the work of each of these groups.
The use of internal personnel for the development of the entire system, for the installation, and for the validation was the best system in this case. In addition, internal personnel now know all weaknesses and strengths of the entire system, which is very important for maintenance and repair work. The IVI now has a well-adapted and well embedded chemical effluent treatment system and did not encounter any serious technical problems during construction. Finally, the IVI now has the ability to perform ABSL-3 animal experiments with all the required safety measures in place.
